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H
ow monetary policy affects economic activity
is a perennial question in macroeconomics.
One of the main impediments to answering this
question is the absence of agreement on what is
an accurate gauge of monetary policy. Histori-
cally, many economists have used changes in the
quantity of money as an indicator of changes in
monetary policy. One problem with this approach,
however, is that changes in money can result
from factors other than changes in monetary
policy. For instance, economic conditions can
significantly influence money growth over the
course of the business cycle.
Several economists have argued that move-
ments in short-term interest rates, particularly
movements in the federal funds rate, may be a
better indicator of changes in monetary policy than
are changes in the quantity of money (McCallum
1983, Laurent 1988, Bernanke and Blinder 1992,
and Goodfriend 1992). This view is based on the
observation that, with the exception of the 1979–
82 period, the Federal Reserve appears to have
implemented its monetary policy by targeting the
federal funds rate.
In support of the federal funds rate as a
gauge of monetary policy, Bernanke and Blinder
(1992) present evidence that the federal funds rate
is a better predictor of future economic activity
than are other interest rates or other monetary
aggregates. Additionally, using data before 1979,
they show, using a simple vector autoregression
(VAR), that changes in the federal funds rate are
systematically related to changes in inflation and
unemployment. (See the box entitled “Vector
Autoregressions.”) Specifically, the federal funds
rate rises in response to unexpected increases in
inflation and falls in response to unexpected in-
creases in unemployment. Thus, their results are
consistent with a monetary policy that “leans
against the wind,” or reacts countercyclically to
the business cycle.
In this article, we use simple vector auto-
regressions to examine whether the relationships
found by Bernanke and Blinder for the pre-1979
period persist after 1982, when the Federal Reserve
returned to a policy of explicitly targeting the
federal funds rate. The results provide more recent
evidence on whether sensible monetary policy
reaction functions can be derived using the federal
funds rate as an indicator of the stance of mone-
tary policy, and whether the funds rate has infor-
mation about future inflation and unemployment.
Also, because the vector autoregression methodol-
ogy uncovers correlations among macroeconomic
variables, the results of this examination may
reveal changes in the correlations of macroeco-
nomic variables after 1982 that shed light on
several monetary policy issues.1 For instance, if
monetary policy is now less countercyclical, does
the federal funds rate now respond less to innova-
tions in unemployment or inflation? Do changes in
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the federal funds rate now have less information
content for economic activity? If so, does this
imply that monetary policy became less effective
during the 1980s? While answering these types of
questions using the vector autoregression method-
ology is difficult, VARs do provide correlations
with which economic models must contend.
In this article, we first review the recent
literature on measuring monetary policy. We then
present the empirical results, and finally, we out-
line some interpretations of these findings.
Vector autoregressions and monetary policy
Traditional monetarists (for example, Fried-
man and Schwartz 1963) view the growth of the
money stock as a good indicator of monetary
policy. While traditional monetarists argue that the
money supply has important effects on the real
economy in the short run, they typically stress that
policymakers should avoid the temptation to tempo-
rarily stimulate real economic activity by rapidly
expanding the money supply. Traditional mone-
tarists fear such actions would increase inflation in
the long run and exacerbate the business cycle.
With the advent of rational expectations in macro-
economics, however, most economists view only
unexpected policy actions as having real effects on
the economy. Thus, rational expectations mone-
tarists (for example, Sargent and Wallace 1975)
take the view that only unexpected changes in the
money supply will have temporary real effects,
while expected changes in the money supply will
be immediately reflected in the price level.
Sims (1980) questions the importance of
unexpected changes in money for future changes
in economic activity. Using a four-variable VAR,
he shows that once the information content of
interest rates is taken into account, only a small
portion of the unexpected variation in output can
be attributed to unexpected changes in the money
supply. While some researchers have questioned
the robustness of Sims’ results, the conclusion that
interest rates have substantial information content
about future economic activity has held up. For a
time, these results were considered damaging to
the view that monetary policy is an important
factor in explaining business cycles.
However, later research (McCallum 1983 and
Laurent 1988) maintains that Sims’ results do not
imply that monetary policy is unimportant in deter-
mining economic activity. These economists argue
that because the Federal Reserve conducts policy
by targeting the federal funds rate and because
changes in the money supply can be caused by
factors other than changes in monetary policy,
unexpected changes in the federal funds rate may
be a better measure of monetary policy than un-
expected movements in the money supply.
If the federal funds rate is a good indicator
of monetary policy and monetary policy has real
effects on the economy, then the federal funds
rate should be a good predictor of economic
variables. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) show that
the federal funds rate is a good predictor of major
macroeconomic variables before 1979 and that the
federal funds rate better predicts macroeconomic
variables than other interest rates or monetary
aggregates.2 Bernanke and Blinder also discover,
using a simple VAR, that the federal funds rate
responds to variables the Federal Reserve has been
traditionally concerned with—unemployment and
inflation. In other words, “reaction functions” can
be estimated in which monetary policy (changes
in the federal funds rate) reacts countercyclically
in response to unexpected movements in unem-
ployment and inflation.
In the next section of this article, we examine
whether the relationships found by Bernanke and
Blinder for the pre-1980 period held up during
the 1980s.
Empirical results
Pre-1980 results. Bernanke and Blinder (1992)
specify a series of three-variable VARs consisting
of a measure of monetary policy, the prime-age
(25–54) male unemployment rate, and the infla-
tion rate as measured by the consumer price index.
Each variable is regressed on six lags of itself
and six lags of the other two remaining variables.
The data are monthly, starting with July 1959 and
ending in September 1979, when interest rate
2 When post-1979 data are added to their sample, the statis-
tical significance of the federal funds rate in prediction
equations generally declines. Their results are consistent
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targeting was de-emphasized. Bernanke and
Blinder impose recursivity on the system using
the Choleski decomposition, with the ordering
from the policy variable to the unemployment
rate to the inflation rate.
Bernanke and Blinder use both the federal
funds rate and the spread between the federal funds
rate and the ten-year U.S. Treasury bond rate,
henceforth the spread, as indicators of monetary
policy. The spread is an alternative indicator of
monetary policy because it controls for the general
level of market interest rates and therefore provides
further information about whether a particular
level of the federal funds rate represents a restric-
tive or loose monetary policy. Figure 1 plots both
the federal funds rate and the spread.3 Note that
the spread is nearly a mirror image of the federal
Vector autoregressions (VARs) are
time series models that use only past values
of the variables of interest to make forecasts.
For instance, a three-variable VAR system of
interest rates, unemployment, and inflation
can be expressed as
Rt = β1 + Σ Rt–i + Σ Ut–i + Σ πt–i + Rt
Ut = β2 + Σ Rt–i + Σ Ut–i + Σ πt–i + Ut
πt = β3 + Σ Rt–i + Σ Ut–i + Σ πt–i + πt,
where  R,  U, and π are the interest rate,
unemployment rate, and inflation rate, re-
spectively. β is an intercept term, t is a time
subscript, and  is an error term. Thus, each
of the three variables is expressed as a linear
function of past values of itself and past val-
ues of other variables in the system.
In practice, the estimated error terms
from each equation are correlated so that it is
not correct to assume that, for instance, Ut
represents an independent surprise move-
ment in the unemployment rate. To better
interpret the dynamic relationships present in
the data, the residuals from the VAR are
broken up into linear combinations of inde-
pendent (orthogonal) shocks. A common or-
thogonalization is to assume that the VAR
system is recursive so that there is a chain of
causality among surprises in the variables
during any given period. For example, a pos-
Vector Autoregressions
sible recursive system of the VAR above is
one in which the interest rate responds to an
exogenous shock, and unemployment re-
sponds to the contemporaneous interest rate
and an exogenous unemployment shock,
while the inflation rate responds to the con-
temporaneous interest rate, contemporane-
ous unemployment rate, and an exogenous
inflation shock. In effect, new surprises, or a
shock term for each variable, are created that
are now uncorrelated with each other. The
transformation of the original shocks into re-
cursive, orthogonal shocks is called the
Choleski decomposition.
The Choleski decomposition is contro-
versial because if the VAR is used to draw
economic inferences, then the recursive re-
striction imposed on the system should be
supported by economic theory. If the identify-
ing assumption of recursivity is not justified,
then the estimated parameters will be a mix-
ture of both structural and reduced-form pa-
rameters. However, for forecasting purposes,
the use of Choleski decompositions in VARs
does not pose a problem because no eco-
nomic inferences are being drawn from the
estimated parameters.1
1 For more on VARs, see Todd (1990), Runkle (1987), Sims
(1986), Cooley and LeRoy (1985), and Hakkio and Morris
(1984).
3 A similar figure appears in Bernanke and Blinder (1992).Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 4
Table 2 presents the forecast error variance
decompositions for the VAR, including the federal
funds rate and M2.4 A variance decomposition
divides the total forecast error variance, at different
forecast horizons, into portions attributable to
shocks in each of the variables in the system.5
From Table 2, we find a substantial proportion of
the forecast error variance in the federal funds rate
is caused by uncertainty about the future values
of unemployment and inflation. In other words,
knowledge about future states of the economy
tells us something about future movements in the
federal funds rate. The decompositions for infla-
tion and unemployment indicate that uncertainty
about future values of the federal funds rate con-
tributes only modestly to uncertainty about their
future values. The contribution of federal funds
shocks to the forecast variance of unemployment
tends to be greater at longer horizons than that of
M2. On the other hand, M2 tends to contribute
more to the forecast variance of inflation than does
the federal funds rate. Still, the majority of the
forecast error variance for inflation and unemploy-
ment arises from uncertainty about shocks to those
variables themselves.6
Overall, the federal funds rate had important
predictive content for unemployment and inflation
during the period July 1959–September 1979. This
funds rate. In general, as Bernanke and Blinder
point out, run-ups in the federal funds rate have
preceded the onset of all recessions since 1959.
Because the estimation results for the indi-
vidual equations within a VAR system are of little
interest, they are not reported here. Table 1, how-
ever, reports the marginal significance level of
exclusion tests for lags of the right-hand side vari-
ables. As in Bernanke and Blinder, the hypothesis
that lags of inflation or unemployment can be
excluded from the federal funds rate equation is
easily rejected. This result indicates that the recent
state of the economy, as measured by lagged infla-
tion and unemployment, contains information about
future movements in the federal funds rate. In addi-
tion, lags of the federal funds rates are significant
in both the inflation and unemployment equations,
suggesting, at a minimum, that knowledge of the
federal funds rate helps predict these variables.
The results for the spread between the ten-year
Treasury bond rate and the federal funds rate are
qualitatively similar to those of the federal fund
rate; for this reason, we do not present them here.
When M2 growth is added to the three-
variable system, the federal funds rate still retains
its importance (as measured by the significance
levels) in explaining the behavior of inflation; the
rate is somewhat less important for unemploy-
ment. Furthermore, we can reject the hypothesis
that the federal funds rate can be dropped from
the four-variable system consisting of federal funds
rate, M2 growth, unemployment, and inflation.
4 We employ a Choleski decomposition with the ordering of
federal funds rate, M2, unemployment, and inflation. The
qualitative results are unchanged if M2 and the federal
funds rate or unemployment and inflation are switched in
the ordering.
5 The 90-percent confidence bands for the variance decom-
positions and impulse response functions (reported below)
are generated using a Monte Carlo procedure and are
available from the authors on request.
6 Using the spread variable, the forecast error variance
decompositions are similar. However, shocks to the spread
contribute less to the total inflation forecast error variance,
and shocks to inflation contribute less to the total spread
forecast error variance.
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is the case even after allowing for the effect of
money aggregates, as measured by M2. This finding
provides indirect evidence that the federal funds
rate may be a good indicator of monetary policy.
An additional source of evidence provided
by Bernanke and Blinder is that the response of
the federal funds rate to shocks in unemployment
and inflation is consistent with a “lean against the
wind” policy; that is, the federal funds rate rises in
response to a positive inflation shock and falls in
response to a positive unemployment shock.
Figures 2 and 3 plot impulse response func-
tions for the three-variable VAR that includes the
federal funds rate, unemployment, and inflation
and is estimated over the sample period up to
September 1979.7 Figure 2 displays the response
of the federal funds rate over time to unexpected
movements in inflation and unemployment.8 As
underscored by Bernanke and Blinder, the plots
look very much like “lean against the wind” mone-
Table 1
Marginal Significance Levels for Exclusion of Lags, 1959–79
Three-variable system (federal funds rate, unemployment, inflation)
Marginal Significance Levels
Lags of
Federal funds Unemployment Inflation
Equation
Federal funds .0000 .0000 .0002
Unemployment .0092 .0000 .2300
Inflation .0000 .0698 .1304
Four-variable system (federal funds rate, M2, unemployment, inflation)
Marginal Significance Levels
Lags of
Federal funds M2 Unemployment Inflation
Equation
Federal funds .0000 .0357 .0003 .0035
M2 .0000 .0000 .0897 .4875
Unemployment .1140 .1032 .0000 .1032
Inflation .0000 .0063 .2523 .2376
Tests for dropping variable from four-variable system
M2 χ2(18) = 40.88 (.0016)
Federal funds χ2(18) = 85.50 (.0000)
tary policy reaction functions. The federal funds
rate rises in response to an unexpected increase
in inflation and falls in response to an unexpected
increase in unemployment.
Figure 3 displays the responses of unem-
ployment and inflation to an innovation in the
federal funds rate. The qualitative pattern of the
impulse response function for unemployment is
7 The qualitative behavior of the impulse responses using the
spread variable as the monetary policy variable is very
similar.
8 The ordering of the unemployment rate and the inflation rate
in the VAR does not affect the results that follow. Also, the
inclusion of money growth, as measured by M2, in the VAR
system does not qualitatively affect the impulse responses
of the other three variables.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 6
broadly consistent with the view that unexpected
changes in the federal funds rate represent changes
in monetary policy. Figure 3 shows that after a
temporary and short-lived fall, the unemployment
rate rises in response to an unexpected increase
in the federal funds rate. On the other hand, the
inflation rate response moves the wrong way if
one interprets a surprise increase in the federal
funds rate as a tightening of monetary policy. This
“price level” effect, noted by Eichenbaum (1992) in
his comment on Sims (1992), raises doubts about
interpreting federal funds rate innovations as
unexpected monetary policy changes.9 This price
level effect, does not, however, necessarily pro-
vide evidence against the effectiveness of a “lean
against the wind” policy. The reason is that such a
countercyclical policy, to the extent that it is pre-
dictable, would be embodied in the coefficients of
the VAR and not necessarily be reflected in unex-
pected movements of the federal funds rate.10
Post-1982 results
In this section, we examine whether the
relationships found by Bernanke and Blinder
persist during the 1980s. There are several reasons
they may not. First, financial innovation and
deregulation during the 1980s may have changed
the effectiveness and the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy (Bosworth 1989 and Kahn
1989). Second, the high-inflation decade of the
1970s may have changed the way the public reacts
to inflation. In particular, the Phillips curve may
have steepened, lessening even the short-term
trade-off between inflation and unemployment.
Furthermore, financial markets may have become
more sensitive to inflation fears, and these con-
cerns are more readily reflected in increases in
long-term interest rates. Finally, the Federal Reserve
may have focused more of its policy on control-
Figure 2
Responses of Federal Funds Rate to Inflation
and Unemployment Shocks
Percent
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9 Similarly, Gordon and Leeper (1993) cite this effect in
arguing that innovations in the federal funds rate are an
inappropriate indicator of monetary policy. As an alterna-
tive, they construct a structural model of the money market
to identify monetary policy surprises.
10 Another explanation for this price level effect would be to
distinguish between nominal and real federal funds rate
innovations. Many analysts would argue that a monetary
policy tightening occurs only when the real federal funds
rate rises. The price level effect found here may only signal
that increases in the nominal federal funds rate are not as
large as the contemporaneous increases in inflation and,
therefore, do not constitute a tightening of monetary policy.
An examination of the viability of the real federal funds rate
as an indicator of monetary policy is left for future research.Economic Review — First Quarter 1994 7
ling inflation before inflation accelerates. This shift
may be the result of a heightened aversion to
inflation by the public or increased awareness by
the Federal Reserve of the limitations of monetary
policy in affecting the real economy.
Is the VAR evidence still consistent with the
view that the federal funds rate is a good indicator
of monetary policy? The first step in answering
this question is to test whether there is any evi-
dence of structural instability in the VAR system
after 1982.11 VARs are estimated over the November
1982–September 1992 period and are compared
with VARs estimated over the July 1959–September
1979 period. Using standard likelihood-ratio tests,
Table 2
Forecast Error Variance Decompositions, 1959–79
Federal funds rate
Forecast
horizon Federal funds M2 Unemployment Inflation
6 77.7 2.9 8.9 10.5
12 51.7 9.3 18.7 20.3
24 30.5 31.9 22.2 15.5
36 23.9 41.6 21.8 12.7
M2
Forecast
horizon Federal funds M2 Unemployment Inflation
6 22.5 70.3 3.3 4.0
12 21.1 64.0 8.1 6.8
24 23.1 60.0 9.8 7.1
36 24.3 58.0 9.4 8.3
Unemployment rate
Forecast
horizon Federal funds M2 Unemployment Inflation
6 1.1 2.8 96.2 .3
12 1.7 6.0 90.4 .6
24 13.2 10.2 68.1 3.6
36 23.8 8.7 57.5 8.0
Inflation rate
Forecast
horizon Federal funds M2 Unemployment Inflation
6 12.9 7.7 2.9 76.5
12 17.2 11.8 4.7 66.2
24 15.5 24.5 6.7 52.3
36 14.2 33.6 8.0 44.2
Percentage of forecast error variance explained by
Percentage of forecast error variance explained by
Percentage of forecast error variance explained by
Percentage of forecast error variance explained by
11 We exclude the October 1979–September 1982 period,
when the Federal Reserve de-emphasized the targeting of
interest rates in setting monetary policy.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 8
the hypothesis of stability is easily rejected for the
VAR systems using both the federal funds rate
and the spread and including and excluding M2
(Table 3).12 Taken equation by equation, there is
also evidence that the correlation structure from
the 1959–79 period differs from that of the 1982–92
period.
Does the federal funds rate retain its predic-
tive ability in the post-1982 period? Table 4 displays
the marginal significance level of exclusion tests
for the post-1982 period. The federal funds rate
still has predictive content for inflation and unem-
ployment, with significance levels close to or less
than 10 percent; therefore, we can strongly reject
the hypothesis that the federal funds rate can be
dropped from the system. M2, however, loses
much of its predictive power in the later sample;
therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that M2
can be dropped from the system. Furthermore, the
significance levels of lags of unemployment and
inflation in the federal funds equation indicate that
these variables do not explain much of the move-
ment in the federal funds rate in the later period.
Examining the forecast error variance decom-
positions for the VAR from the pre-1980 and post-
1982 periods (Table 5), the federal funds rate still
explains a modest percentage of the forecast
variance of unemployment and inflation. The con-
tribution of M2, on the other hand, falls substan-
tially in the post-1982 period. Thus, it appears that
the federal funds rate has become more important
relative to M2 in explaining the behavior of infla-
tion and unemployment in the post-1982 period.
Perhaps the most striking difference in the
variance decompositions is the small percentage
of the forecast error variance for the federal funds
rate that can be attributed to uncertainty about
future inflation. In other words, inflation shocks
Table 3
Test for Structural Change Between the 1959–79
and 1982–92 Samples
Three-variable system (federal funds rate, unemployment, inflation)
Entire system χ2(57) = 137.0 (.0000)




Four-variable system (federal funds, M2, unemployment, inflation)
Entire system χ2(100) = 219.5 (.0000)





12 Evidence of a unit root in the level of the federal funds rate
and the unemployment rate made us cautious about using
the data in levels form to make inferences using likelihood-
ratio tests. However, instability was also found when the
VAR system was estimated in first differences. There was
also evidence of instability when the system was estimated
in error-correction form using a cointegrating vector found
by the methodology developed by Johansen and Juselius
(1990).Economic Review — First Quarter 1994 9
account for little of the variability in the federal
funds rate in the later period. This finding raises
questions about the traditional monetary policy
interpretation of the federal funds rate, since that
interest rate does not appear to respond to infla-
tion shocks in the post-1982 period.13 Additionally,
the variance decompositions indicate that a larger
percentage of the forecast variance in the federal
funds rate can be attributed to uncertainty about
innovations to the federal funds rate itself. It seems
the federal funds rate has become more inde-
pendent of the other variables in the VAR during
the 1980s.
Figures 4 and 5 present impulse responses
for the post-1982 period for the three-variable
VAR.14 Figure 4 displays the reaction of the federal
funds rate to unexpected increases in inflation and
unemployment. The response of the federal funds
rate to an unexpected increase in the unemploy-
ment rate in the post-1982 period is less than that
in the previous period, although it does indicate a
loosening of monetary policy in response to a sur-
prise increase in unemployment. Additionally, the
90-percent confidence bands of the two responses
overlap and, hence, are not statistically different
from each other. On the other hand, the response
of the federal funds rate to an unexpected increase
Table 4
Marginal Significance Levels for Exclusion of Lags, 1982–92
Three-variable system (federal funds rate, unemployment, inflation)
Marginal Significance Levels
Lags of
Federal funds Unemployment Inflation
Equation
Federal funds .0000 .1700 .8184
Unemployment .0923 .0000 .6415
Inflation .0133 .5909 .0003
Four-variable system (federal funds rate, M2, unemployment, inflation)
Marginal Significance Levels
Lags of
Federal funds M2 Unemployment Inflation
Equation
Federal funds .0000 .1060 .3003 .3911
M2 .0000 .0033 .7979 .0322
Unemployment .1163 .6812 .0000 .6765
Inflation .0362 .8822 .6827 .0006
Tests for dropping variable from four-variable system
M2 χ2(18) = 18.66 (.4129)
Federal funds χ2(18) = 65.04 (.0000)
13 Again, the variance decompositions using the spread are
similar except that uncertainty about future inflation contrib-
utes little to the forecast error variance of the spread (and
vice versa) in both the earlier and later periods.
14 The differences in the impulse responses between the two
periods result mainly from differences in the estimated
coefficients of the VAR equations and not from differences
in the sizes of the standard deviation shocks. The size of the
shocks for each variable are very close across the two
periods.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 10
in inflation does not correspond to a “lean against
the wind” reaction function. The federal funds
rate for the most part fails to respond at all to an
inflation shock, and the confidence bands of the
two responses do not overlap over a horizon of
three to twenty months.15 A “lean against the wind”
policy would suggest an increase in the federal
funds rate in response to a positive inflation
shock. Therefore, whereas in the earlier sample
a monetary policy reaction interpretation could
be applied, in the 1982–92 period the response
of the policy variables do not look like typical
reaction functions.16
Finally, the response of unemployment and
inflation to shocks in the federal funds rate casts
further doubt on the interpretation of federal
funds rate innovations as monetary policy changes
in the post-1982 period (Figure 5). The response
of unemployment to unexpected increases in the
federal funds rate is negative in the post-1982
period rather than positive as in the 1959–79
period (the 90-percent confidence bands of two
responses do not overlap after thirteen months).
The response of inflation in the post-1982 period
to a federal funds rate shock, as in the pre-1980
period, moves in the wrong direction but is much
less persistent in the post-1982 period than in the
earlier period.
Thus, while the federal funds rate has become
more important relative to M2 in explaining infla-
tion and unemployment, it appears that the Federal
Reserve no longer “leans against the wind” with
respect to inflation shocks in the post-1982 period.
As a final note, the above results are robust to
using the core-CPI inflation rate rather than just the
CPI inflation rate and to trying to control for the
effect of the decline in 1986 oil prices by introduc-
ing a dummy variable for this period into the VAR.
Possible interpretations of the results
As noted in the box on vector autoregres-
sions, making economic inferences from estimated
VARs is controversial. The fundamental difficulty
is that the estimated relationships are derived
from reduced-form equations. Thus, VARs provide
evidence on correlations in the data, but these
correlations may be consistent with a number of
Figure 4






































15 The spread between the ten-year Treasury bond yield and
the federal funds rate actually increases in response to a
positive inflation shock.
16 Supporting this point, lagged inflation is no longer statisti-
cally significant in the federal funds rate equation.Economic Review — First Quarter 1994 11
economic theories.17 In this section, we discuss
several plausible interpretations of the changed
relationships found from the VARs above. These
interpretations rely on developments in monetary
policy issues that arose during the 1980s.
That the Federal Reserve no longer “leans
against the wind” with respect to inflation in the
post-1982 period is somewhat surprising given the
supposedly higher premium the Federal Reserve
put on price stability during this period. Economic
models of monetary policy indicate that a mon-
etary authority’s increased desire to fight inflation
results in policy’s being tightened more severely
in the case of an unexpected increase in the infla-
tion rate (Ball 1990 and Alogoskoufis and Smith
Table 5




horizon Federal funds M2 Unemployment Inflation
6 89.4 5.7 4.4 .6
12 75.7 10.6 12.4 1.2
24 72.5 11.6 14.3 1.5
36 73.3 12.7 12.7 1.3
M2
Forecast
horizon Federal funds M2 Unemployment Inflation
6 18.6 63.1 .3 18.0
12 24.4 56.7 1.4 17.5
24 28.7 52.8 2.2 16.3
36 32.2 50.2 2.5 15.1
Unemployment rate
Forecast
horizon Federal funds M2 Unemployment Inflation
6 22.6 .6 76.5 0.3
12 21.3 1.3 75.3 2.1
24 23.4 1.8 70.3 4.5
36 26.6 2.6 66.2 4.5
Inflation rate
Forecast
horizon Federal funds M2 Unemployment Inflation
6 11.0 3.6 1.7 83.7
12 11.5 4.2 3.2 81.0
24 12.3 4.3 3.7 79.8
36 12.6 4.3 3.7 79.3
17 In other words, the economic theories have “observationally
equivalent” reduced forms.
Percentage of forecast error variance explained by
Percentage of forecast error variance explained by
Percentage of forecast error variance explained by
Percentage of forecast error variance explained byFederal Reserve Bank of Dallas 12
1991). If the federal funds rate is a good indicator
of monetary policy, these results indicate just the
opposite: the policy response to an increase in the
inflation rate became muted during the 1980s.
One plausible explanation of the results that
reconciles the muted response of the federal funds
rate with an increase in the Federal Reserve’s
resolve to fight inflation is evidence that the
behavior of inflation changed during the 1980s.
Inflation since the early 1980s exhibits substan-
tially less persistence than in the previous period,
so that increases in inflation one month are tem-
porary and, in fact, tend to be followed by a
decrease in the next month (Emery, forthcoming).
This change in the persistence of inflation is
reflected in the difference between the response
of inflation to federal funds shocks in the two
periods noted in Figure 5. The behavior of infla-
tion during the 1980s implies that lagged values of
inflation provide little information about inflation
in the future. As a result, unexpected movements
in inflation, as measured by the VAR, no longer
require a monetary policy response.
An additional explanation is that the Federal
Reserve has abandoned a “lean against the wind”
policy and instead conducts monetary policy in a
more forward-looking manner. That is, the Federal
Reserve increases the federal funds rate in antici-
pation of inflation so as to not get behind the
curve with respect to fighting inflation. Since low-
dimension VARs, such as the ones examined in
this article, probably do not reflect all the informa-
tion available to the monetary authorities at the
time policy decisions are made, the estimated
impulse response function for the federal funds
rate may not adequately capture the forward-
looking nature of monetary policy.
Sims (1992) uses a similar argument in
explaining the perverse inflation response to a
federal funds rate innovation. Because the VAR
does not reflect all the information available to the
monetary authority when it conducts policy, the
federal funds innovations in these VARs still reflect
systematic policy responses. Therefore, the posi-
tive response of inflation to a positive federal
funds innovation is really capturing the increase in
the federal funds rate in anticipation (correctly) of
inflation. The resultant tightening is not sufficient
to completely eliminate the subsequent inflation-
ary pressures. If, indeed, this price puzzle does
reflect a forward-looking Federal Reserve, then
because this price puzzle is present in both periods
(even more so in the earlier period, as indicated
in Figure 5), it appears that the Federal Reserve is
not substantially more forward-looking in the
1982–92 period than in the 1959–79 period.
Of course, it is very possible that the two
explanations offered here are related. A more
forward-looking Federal Reserve could conceivably
be better able to diminish the persistence of infla-
tion by effectively offsetting fluctuations in the
underlying trend inflation rate, so that the price
level effect is diminished. Many analysts have
maintained that the Federal Reserve stabilized the
inflation rate around 4 percent during most of the
1980s (Goodfriend 1992) and that as a result of
this policy, deviations of inflation away from 4 per-
cent were temporary. By contrast, movements in
inflation before 1980 tended to be more indicative
of rising or ebbing inflationary pressures because
the Federal Reserve did not respond quickly
enough to changing price pressures (Figure 6 ).
Conclusions
The vector autoregression evidence on the
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policy weakens when the period since 1982 is
examined. Specifically, in contrast to the pre-1980
period, the federal funds rate no long displays a
“lean against the wind” response to inflation—that
is, it does not increase in response to unexpected
increases in inflation. However, this change does
not necessarily imply that the federal funds rate is
no longer an indicator of monetary policy. The
vector autoregression results indicate that after
1982, the federal funds rate responds to unex-
pected changes in the unemployment rate in a
manner similar to that before 1980 and consistent
with a traditional monetary policy interpretation.
Furthermore, there exist several possible explana-
tions that are consistent with a monetary policy
interpretation of the federal funds rate.18
Nonetheless, the main message of this article
is to highlight how correlations between impor-
tant macroeconomic variables can change when
institutions or policy regimes change. While the
federal funds rate may still be a good indicator of
monetary policy, its relationship with unemploy-
ment and inflation is now clearly different from
what it was before 1980.
18 See Goodfriend (1992) for a narrative approach that sup-
ports the use of the federal funds rate, in addition to other
long-term rates, as a good indicator of monetary policy
during the 1980s.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 14
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